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Abstract
Background: The extent to which people ascribe mind to others has been shown to predict the extent to which
human rights are conferred. Therefore, in the context of disorders of consciousness (DOC), mind ascription can
influence end of life decisions. A previous US-American study indicated that participants ascribed even less mind to
patients with unresponsive-wakefulness-syndrome (UWS) than to the dead. Results were explained in terms of
implicit dualism and religious beliefs, as highly religious people ascribed least mind to UWS. Here, we addresses
mind ascription to UWS patients in Germany.
Methods: We investigate the perception of UWS patients in a large German sample (N = 910) and compare the
results to the previous US data, addressing possible cultural differences. We further assess effects of medical
expertise, age, gender, socio-economic status and subjective knowledge about UWS in the German sample.
Results: Unlike the US sample, German participants did not perceive UWS patients as “more dead than dead”,
ascribing either equal (on 3 of 5 items) or more (on 2 items) mental abilities to UWS patients than to the dead.
Likewise, an effect of implicit dualism was not replicated and German medically trained participants ascribed more
capabilities to UWS patients than did a non-medical sample. Within the German sample, age, gender, religiosity and
socio-economic status explained about 15% of the variability of mind ascription. Age and religiosity were
individually significant predictors, younger and more religious people ascribing more mind. Gender had no effect.
Conclusion: Results are consistent with cross-cultural differences in the perception of UWS between Germany and
the USA, Germans ascribing more mind to UWS patients. The German sample ascribed as much or more but not
less mind to a UWS patient than to a deceased, although within group variance was large, calling for further
research. Mind ascription is vital, because, in times of declining resources for healthcare systems, and an increasing
legalization of euthanasia, public opinion will influence UWS patients’ rights and whether ‘the right to die’ will be
the only right conceded to them.
Keywords: Mind perception, Morality, End of life decisions, Dualism, Disorders of consciousness
Background
‘How shall we regard those in [permanent vegetative
state]? They are periodically awake, and their bodies
breathe and digest on their own. These traits bespeak
life. Yet they are not conscious and never will be: sub-
jectively, this is death’ [1] (p. 41).
Medical progress has provided the public with a
clinical picture that seems to blur the line between
life and death. Patients with the unresponsive wake-
fulness syndrome (UWS; [2]; former vegetative state,
VS; [3, 4] are defined to have no self-awareness or
conscious perception of their surroundings. Since the
body is undoubtedly alive, whether or not the ‘person’
him- or herself still is seems hard to determine. Even
relatives close to the patients can get confused about
this issue. Holland et al., for example, report inter-
views with relatives of long-term UWS patients,
showing that some relatives literally state that a pa-
tient is dead and alive in quick succession. For
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example, they quote ‘Brian’, a brother of a UWS pa-
tient with: ‘He’s already dead. The only reason he’s
not dead is because his heart pumps […]’ [5] (p. 417).
Accordingly, there is an ongoing ethical debate
whether or not UWS patients should be considered ‘per-
sons’ [6] and although DiSilvestro et al. come to the con-
clusion that they should, others disagree [7], implying
that there is uncertainty even among the scientific and
(medical)-ethics community.
One possible explanation for this uncertainty of a
UWS patient’s ontological state could lie in the cri-
teria based upon which people tend to ascribe mind.
As pointed out by Waytz [8], people ascribe mind to
others (or even to objects) whenever they ascribe ex-
perience and agency. Here, agency is seen as the
ability to exert willful behaviors beyond mere reflect-
ive or spontaneous movements which function on an
automatic level. It has been suggested that, when it
comes to UWS patients, many focus on the body of
the patient and since these ‘bodies’ lack all signs of
agency and as it remains unclear whether or not
they are able to consciously experience anything,
people may hesitate to ascribe a mind to UWS pa-
tients. This assumption has been backed up by a
study of Gray and colleagues with the striking title:
‘More dead than dead’ [9], whose participants indeed
ascribed less mind to a UWS patient than to a re-
cently deceased person.
In this study, Gray and colleagues conducted a series
of experiments to determine how much mind is ascribed
to a UWS patient in comparison to either a healthy per-
son or a deceased individual (experiment 1, n = 201).
They also tested for religious beliefs as a variable poten-
tially influencing mind ascription in their participants
(experiment 2, n = 143). In a third experiment (n = 55),
participants were asked to imagine to either die or fall
into UWS themselves and were asked to rate how bad
each of these outcomes would be for them and their
families. Consistently, participants rated UWS patients
to have less mind than the deceased. Religiosity and im-
plicit dualism (the belief, that matter and spirit are sep-
arate from one another, irrespective of religiosity) were
found to influence mind ascription in that religious per-
sons and those holding implicit dualism, ascribed more
mind to the dead. In general, participants rated UWS to
be a state worse than death, both, for themselves and for
their families.
If so, this could have complex and severe conse-
quences for patients, because, as Waytz showed, with
the ascription of mind, moral rights are also conferred
[8]. Conversely, if a person is seen as relatively mindless,
we also risk objectifying him or her, consequently deny-
ing human rights [6, 10, 11], because the patient is no
longer seen as a ‘person’ at all [6]. Whereas from the
scientific point of view, the ‘real’ mental status of a UWS
patient cannot yet be conclusively determined [12–14],
it seems safe to say, that any living brain should have the
capacity to experience more than a dead brain. In this
regard, many recent studies have shown that UWS pa-
tients can exhibit a considerable range of cerebral re-
sponses to external stimuli [15–19]. Therefore, although
we are not aware of any replication, Gray et al.’s study
suggests a widely held misperception that could be to
the disadvantage of the UWS patients, particularly, given
that misdiagnosis rates for these patients are very high
[20, 21] and, although prognosis is generally rather poor
[22, 23], unexpected recovery can occur [24–26].
Historically, it is known that in times of limited
resources, terminal and severely ill patients’ right to
live has been questioned [27, 28]. Strikingly, when-
ever there is a discussion concerning passive or even
active euthanasia, UWS patients are recommended
first [27, 29]. The most common argument used to
justify euthanasia in general is salvation from un-
necessary suffering [30], although this should exclude
UWS patients from eligibility for euthanasia, since, if
diagnosed correctly, the syndrome precludes suffer-
ing. Still, it seems that ‘the right to die’ is often seen
as the only right left for these patients [28, 29]. In
Europe, there have even been political efforts to-
wards common regulations for passive euthanasia for
UWS patients which failed due to ‘different tradi-
tions and cultures concerning the matter’ [31]. Thus,
even in the Western world, different cultures may
hold different beliefs about UWS patients. Given the
very concerning results of the Gray et al. study with
US participants and the constantly declining finan-
cial support and resources in the health systems of
most Western countries, it is vital to investigate the
public beliefs about UWS patients as well as the fac-
tors influencing these perceptions.
Here, we aim to replicate and extend the series of
studies reported by Gray et al., with a large German
sample. So far, no published replication of Gray et
al. exists, precluding strong claims about the gener-
ality of the findings. However, although USA and
Germany, as Western cultures, are similar in many
ways, there are also substantial differences that
might influence the perception of UWS itself as well
as the perceived tragedy of the resulting situation.
According to Hofstede [32, 33], there are mainly six
dimensions that can be used to characterize different
cultures (see Additional file 1: Table S1). In particu-
lar, the scales of ‘individualism - collectivism’ and
‘avoidance of uncertainty’, reveal substantial differ-
ences between Germany and the US. The USA
scores highest among 76 countries on individualism
and the society is quite tolerant against uncertainties
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(rank 64 of 76 countries). US Americans value the
self determined ‘I’ and the right and ability to live a
self determined life. Autonomy and self-actualization
are ultimate goals and freedom an individualist’s
ideal [33]. Americans value leisure time and the ful-
fillment of desires, ‘now’ over ‘then’, and are, in gen-
eral, not too concerned about the future [32].
Therefore, UWS could be considered the exact op-
posite of the life values of US Americans.
For Germans, living in a more moderately individualist
culture and being very avoidant of uncertainty, the situ-
ation could be different: UWS, although undoubtedly
tragic, may interfere a little less with cultural values
(since for example personal freedom and autonomy of
the self are not valued as highly as in the USA). Further-
more, because they have little tolerance for uncertainties,
Germans tend to think through most possibilities of
‘what could happen’ in life and have insurances for all
eventualities [34]. German obligatory health insurance
indeed covers the unlikely event of UWS. There is also a
special “care allowance” (‘Pflegegeld’) that is paid to
care-giving family members as well as access to highly
professional care institutions or outpatient care services
to disburden families (‘Bundesministerium für Gesund-
heit’: http://www.pflegestaerkungsgesetz.de/ 11.04.2017).
Ironically, for Germans, ‘having things thought through’
and feeling prepared could, in the unlikely event of hav-
ing to care for a UWS patient or becoming one oneself,
help to reduce the perceived tragedy of the UWS situ-
ation. Therefore, UWS could be regarded as more aver-
sive in the USA than in Germany.
According to Hofstede [32, 33], short-term oriented
cultures like the USA are also characterized by the
belief that matter and spirit/mind are separated. Thus,
members of such cultures should hold both explicit
religious beliefs and implicit dualism. Long-term ori-
ented cultures like Germany, on the other hand, in
general, believe that matter and mind are integrated
(which still allows for explicit religiosity but reduces
implicit dualism). Indeed, Gray et al. [9] clearly dem-
onstrated a separation in the perception of mind and
matter (ascribing mental abilities to the deceased and
none to the UWS patient) for their US sample. Ac-
cording to the above reasoning, Germans may gener-
ally ascribe more mind to UWS patients, since a
living body is less likely seen without mind.
Besides general cultural factors, experience with UWS
might also affect mind ascriptions.
Therefore, we asked all participants whether or not
they personally know a UWS patient to assess the influ-
ence of familiarity with the syndrome since our own
clinical experience as well as some studies [35] have
shown, that some caregivers hold hopes for their pa-
tients that are not always shared by the medical staff.
Therefore, we explicitly included medical staff into the
survey who should have expert knowledge in the area
and whom we expected to have had, on average, expos-
ure to both, UWS patients and deceased. The perception
of UWS patients by medical doctors is of special import-
ance since they are often involved in end of life deci-
sions. In fact, it has been shown that up to 70% of all
deaths on the examined critical care units occur due to
discontinued life support which was recommended by
doctors due to an ‘unfavorable prognosis’ (which usually
includes a UWS prognosis) [36, 37]. Whether or not
they ascribe mind to the patients and whether or not
they perceive UWS ‘as a faith worse than death’ [38] is
therefore likely to influence the advice and guidance they
offer the families of patients [27].
Finally, since little is known about the factors influen-
cing UWS perception even within a society, we assessed
the potential influence of general demographic and
socio-economic variables on mind ascription to UWS
patients as an exploratory analysis.
In sum, we expect our German sample to ascribe more
mind to the UWS patients and rate the condition of be-
ing in UWS as less tragic than the US sample did. We
further expect the religious Germans to ascribe more
mind to the deceased than the irreligious participants,
but we expect no effect of implicit dualism within the
German sample. Lastly, we explore the effects of per-
sonal knowledge and medical expertise as well as demo-
graphic variables on mind ascription to UWS patients.
Methods
We included all three experiments of Gray et al. [9] into
a large on-line survey. Therefore, we translated the stor-
ies of David, who, after a car accident, was either alive
(story 1), in UWS (story 2) or dead (story 3 and 4; the
latter with a focus on the dead body in the morgue, re-
ferred to as the ‘corpse-condition’). The names of Ameri-
can cities were replaced with German ones, otherwise,
no changes were made (for both, English and translated
story-vignettes please see Additional file 2: Text S1 and
Additional file 3: Text S2).
Online-setting
Unlike Gray and colleagues, who ran their experiments
1 and 2 as paper and pencil versions and only experi-
ment 3 on-line, here, all stories and questions were pre-
sented as an online survey. One of the four David-
scenarios (life condition, UWS condition, death condi-
tion and corpse condition) were randomly assigned to
each participant. After reading the short story, partici-
pants were asked to rate, on a response-scale from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), the mental abil-
ities of David according to five statements (‘David can
influence the outcome of situations’, ‘David knows right
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from wrong’, ‘he remembers the events of his life’, ‘has
emotions and feelings’, ‘is aware of his environment’ and
‘has a personality’).
After completing this part, all participants were asked
to imagine that they themselves would be involved in a
car accident and would either die or become a long last-
ing UWS patient. They were then asked to rate on a
scale from 1 (not bad at all) to 7 (extremely bad) how
bad the respective outcome would be for a) themselves
and b) for their families. To ensure that envisaged finan-
cial consequences of long time care or burial did not in-
fluence the rating, participants were told that all ensuing
costs were covered by insurance. After that, as a ma-
nipulation check, participants were asked to state what
happened to David in the story they read. The correct
responses for the life-condition (‘alive’), for the UWS-
condition (‘alive, with severe brain damage’), and for
both dead-conditions (‘deceased’) had to be indicated.
Participants who failed to answer correctly were later ex-
cluded from the analysis.
The manipulation check was followed by three ques-
tions about religiosity and how strongly they believe in
life after death. Participants were also asked which reli-
gion they belong to. Then, participants answered some
demographic questions regarding age, gender, and work-
place. Finally, we asked three additional questions: “How
much do you think you know about UWS?”, “I have a
UWS patient within my circle of acquaintances?” And: “I
have/had contact to a patient in UWS?” For question
one answers ranged from: 1 (nothing at all) to 7 (very
much); Question two and three were yes or no ques-
tions. To complete the whole survey, participants
needed about 5 to 10 min.
Participants
German participants were recruited from the Univer-
sity of Bielefeld, personal connections, via Link-
posting on Facebook and Flyers in six different
clinics within the area of Bielefeld, Paderborn and
Bad Salzuflen, state of North Rhine-Westphalia. To
test for cultural differences it is important to recruit
representative samples of participants. Unfortunately,
little information is given about Gray’s US sample. It
is stated that the sample was recruited randomly
from college and metro areas in New England,
Amtrak stations and New York City parks for the
paper and pencil tests (experiment 1, n = 201; experi-
ment 2, n = 143) and from the on-line platform
MTurk to take part in the online survey (experiment
3; n = 55).
In our study a total of 991 participants finished the
questionnaire. Nine participants had to be excluded for
being underaged, 72 participants had to be excluded be-
cause they failed the manipulation check and therefore
seemed to be unable to remember what had happened
to David in their story. This leaves 910 datasets for fur-
ther analysis. Demographics can been seen in Table 1.
Results
Some of the data violated the sphericity requirement
(Levene-test). However, non-parametric testing which
was also performed only leads to numerical but not
qualitative changes. Therefore, in the following, we re-
port parametric tests, to facilitate direct comparison
with the original study.
Table 2 shows results of the random assignment of the
four vignette conditions to the participants.
Mind perception
As in Gray et al., a ‘mind-perception-index’ was formed
by averaging the six mind perception questions. These
indices of all four vignettes were submitted to an ana-
lysis of variance (ANOVA) which showed a significant
effect for condition F(3, 909) = 204.34; p < .001. As Gray
et al., we used Fisher’s least significant difference (LSD)
post hoc test, which showed that the life condition dif-
fers significantly from every other condition (p < .001).
There are also significant differences between the corpse
condition and the death condition (p = .005) as well as
between corpse and UWS (p < .001). UWS and Death
conditions do not differ from each other. However, al-
though mean values do not vary much, as evident from
Table 1 Participants demographics
Mean age (Range) 45 (18–86 years)
Female (%) / Male (%) 580 (64%) / 329 (36%)
Work area:
Students / Medical background / Other work area
319 / 177 / 412
Socio-economical status
Students / Vocational training / Employed university graduates / Graduate professionals / Retirees / Others
344 / 257 / 106 / 132 / 45 / 26
Religiosity:
Christians / Atheists / Buddhist / Muslim / Hindus / other
596 / 265 / 25 / 8 / 2 / 14
‘Students’ include pupils, trainees and students; vocational training include for example physiotherapists, nurses, cooks, hairdressers, kindergarten teachers;
employed university graduates include for example psychologists employed in a clinic; professionals include for example medical doctors and professors; retirees
include all retirees that did not give specifics about previous employment. Classification following [58] recommendations for SES assessment in Germany
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the histogram plot, there are substantially fewer partici-
pants completely denying mental life to the UWS pa-
tients than for both death groups (see Fig. 1).
Like Gray et al., we also analyzed the individual
items. It was confirmed that participants in the life
condition ascribe the most mental capabilities on
every item (p < 0.001). But unlike in the study of Gray
and colleagues, UWS-David compared to the David in
both death conditions was ascribed significantly more
personality and is perceived as possessing more emo-
tions and feelings (see Fig. 2).
Mean mind ascription: present data versus Gray et al
To compare Germany with the USA, the USA means
and standard-deviations were extracted from Gray et al.
and transformed to the same scale (from 1 to 7). There
is no significant difference between either the life condi-
tions assessment of the American participants (n = 67,
M = 5.77, SD = 1.76) and the German ones (n = 257, M =
5.83, SD = 0.95) or for the death condition in the USA
(n = 67, M = 3.71, SD = 1.76) versus Germany (n = 206,
M = 3.23, SD = 1.80). There is, however, a highly signifi-
cant difference between the ascription of mind for the
UWS condition in the USA (n = 67, M = 2.27, SD = 1.36)
and Germany (n = 223, M = 3.42, SD = 1.25), t(288) =
6.47, p < 0.001 (see also Fig. 3), with US participants
ascribing less mind to the UWS patient than Germans
do. There is also an overall difference between the death
Table 2 Random vignette assignment






Expected cell frequency: 227.5; Chi-square test shows no significant deviation
χ2 (3, N = 910) = 6.00, p = 0.11
Fig. 1 Mean mind perception of the participants in the four conditions where David died and the focus of the vignette lay on the dead body
(Corpse), where David died (Death), where David survived but entered UWS (UWS) and where David survived with no further consequences (Life).
Black points are mean values, bars represent the number of participants with respective mean mind perception score
Fig. 2 Perception of mind on individual items for all four vignettes.
Answers above 4 refer to agreement with the item, 4 is neutral,
under 4 indicates disagreement
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and UWS condition occurring only within the US sam-
ple. Due to the fact that mean and standard deviation
for the corpse condition were not reported in the US
study, a cross-cultural comparison between these two
conditions could not be calculated.
Religiosity
Following Gray et al., we averaged the religiosity items
to form a religiosity index. We then split all participants
into thirds according to their scores on this index and
compared those who scored at the top and the bottom
third of the scale (tertiary split, [39]). This results in n =
211 (23%) participants with a low religiosity score and n
= 298 (33%) with a high score. Four hundred one partici-
pants with medium religiosity scores were excluded from
this analysis. We examined differences on the mind per-
ception index in a 4 (dead, corpse, UWS, life) × 2 (religi-
osity high/low) ANOVA. There were significant main
effects for condition F(3, 501) = 123.53, p < 0.001, 2 =
0.43; for religiosity F(1, 501) = 35.90, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.07
(with religious participants ascribing more mind in
general) as well as a small but still highly significant
interaction between the two factors F(3, 501) = 5.67, p =
0.001, 2 = 0.03, essentially resulting from the fact that
a group difference occurred in all conditions except the
life condition (see Fig. 4).
Within both groups, mind perception scores are
higher in the Life than in all other conditions p < 0.001.
Corpse, Death and UWS conditions do not differ within
either group.
Between groups, the corpse conditions differ signifi-
cantly (p < 0.001), as does the death (p < 0.001) and the
UWS condition (p = 0.026). In each case, religious par-
ticipants gave, on average, higher scores than non-
religious ones. There is no between-group difference for
the life condition.
Severity of outcome: present data versus Gray et al
To compare the severity of outcome as perceived by US
and German participants we used the mean values of
the death scale as a reference. We then calculated the
difference for both groups of how much worse or how
Fig. 3 Differences of mind ascription between the conditions life, death and UWS in USA and Germany. Error bars are +/− one
standard deviation
Fig. 4 Histogram for participants with a high and low religiosity-index. Displayed are mean mind perception scores (red point) for the four condi-
tions. Bars represent the number of participants with respective mean mind perception scores
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much better than death, UWS was perceived. This re-
vealed the fact, that, on average, US participants per-
ceived UWS as 1.52 points (on a 7 point scale) worse
than death. Germans feel, on average, that UWS is 0.39
points worse than death. The independent samples t-test
showed that both groups vary highly significant in the
perceived severity of the situation t(223) = 3.18; p =
0.002. We used the same difference measure for when
participants considered how bad this outcome would be
for their families. Here, US participants rated to become
a UWS patient to be 1.04 points worse for their families
than an early death. Germans rated becoming a UWS
patient as 0.01 points better than an early death. Again,
the difference between both ratings is highly significant t
(223) = 5.22; p < 0.001.
Additionally, in the German sample, we found a
significant correlation (r(223) = .25, p < 0.001) between
the mind perception score and the evaluation of the
badness of the situation. It has, however, the opposite
direction than in Gray et al. where less mind was as-
cribed, the worse the condition is viewed. Here we
found, that the more mind is ascribed, the worse the
condition is viewed.
Subjective knowledge and exposure to UWS patients
Correlations within the UWS vignette revealed no cor-
relation between either subjective knowledge about
UWS and mind ascription (r(218) = −.06, p = 0.422) or
real world experience with UWS patients and mind
ascription (point-bi-serial correlation for ‘I have a UWS
patient within my circle of acquaintances’ (Yes/No):
(r(218) = − 10, p = 0.138) and for I have/had contact to a
UWS patient: (r(218) = −.06, p = 0.394)).
Medical background
Since we were especially interested in the perception by
medical staff of UWS patients and the dead, we com-
pared the mind ascription of participants with a medical
background and other participants specifically within the
UWS and Death condition. For better comparability and
in an attempt to exclude other factors like general life
experience, work situation and family status, for this
comparison we excluded all students and trainees from
both groups. Independent samples t-Test within the
UWS vignette reveals a significant difference between
participants with a medical background (n = 54, M =
3.53, SD = 1.30) and other employed participants without
a medical background (n = 94, M = 3.07, SD = 1.17),
(t(158) = − 2.65, p = 0.03), participants with medical
background ascribing more mental capabilities to UWS
patients. For the death vignette there is no such differ-
ence (medical background: n = 36, M = 2.84, SD = 1.78;
no medical background: n = 96, M = 3.21, SD = 1.83)
t(130) = − 1.04, p = 0.30 (see also Fig. 5).
To further analyze the effect of medical expertise for
perception of UWS, an additional sample of medical
professionals was collected. Since the 54 medical profes-
sionals originally assigned to the UWS condition do not
allow for further separations of professions, we addition-
ally recruited further medical professionals in a second
recruitment at the Kliniken Schmieder, Allensbach,
Germany. Because these participants where added post-
hoc, they were not included into any analysis other than
this one. This resulted in n = 71 medical professionals
for this analysis in the PVS condition. Seven participants
had to be excluded due to the fact that the profession
was too rare (for example midwife or pharmacist) for
further analysis. One person had to be excluded because
he stated to work in the medical field but failed to iden-
tify his profession. Further descriptive characteristics are
detailed in Table 3. One-way ANOVA revealed no sig-
nificant differences in mean mind ascription between
the medical groups; F(3, 57) = .959; p = .418. As can be
seen in Table 3, medical doctors do, on average, ascribe
as much mind as do participants with no medical back-
ground and the effect that persons with medical
Fig. 5 Differences in mind ascription from employed participants
with and without medical background for the UWS and death
vignette. Displayed are mean mind perception scores (red point) for
the two conditions. Bars represent the number of participants with
respective mean mind perception score
Table 3 descriptive statistics for medical professionals in
general mind ascription
Mean Std. Deviation N
Medical doctors 2.89 1.52 15
Nurses / paramedics 3.75 1.00 21
Doctor’s assistants 3.40 1.32 13
Therapists /psychologists 3.47 1.16 14
Total 3.41 1.24 63
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background ascribe more mind seems to be mainly
driven by the other medical professions. However, if
tested with t-test for medical doctors vs. all other med-
ical professions, there is a trend, but no significant dif-
ference between professions; t(61) = 1.76; p = .084.
We were further interested in whether doctors perceive
UWS as a state worse than death. We therefore compared
15 doctors from the UWS condition with 22 doctors
within the death and corpse condition. Independent t-test
showed that doctors perceive UWS as equally tragic (M =
6.00) as an early death (M= 5.05); t(35) = 1.16; p = .256 for
themselves and for their families (UWS M= 6.2; early
death M= 6.77; t(35) = 1.42; p = .164).
Regression model
Lastly, we performed a stepwise backward regression
analysis into which we entered the factors: age (as a con-
tinuous variable), gender (coded with 0/1), subjective
knowledge (ranging from 0 to 7), religiosity index (ran-
ging from 0 to 7) and socio-economical status (dummy
coded). Backward exclusion resulted in a model that in-
cluded the factors age, religiosity and socio economic
status. The factors gender and subjective knowledge
were excluded, since their removal did not significantly
reduce the variance explained by the regression model.
The final model was highly significant (F (7/210) = 5.39;
p < 0.001). Together, the factors are able to explain
15.2% of the variance in mind ascription for UWS David
(see Table 4). Age and religiosity were individually sig-
nificant, younger people and more religious people
ascribing more mind, whereas none of the socio eco-
nomic status categories had an individual effect.
Discussion
We assessed to what extent German participants
ascribe mental functions to a UWS patient compared
to a deceased or a healthy person, what factors influ-
ence this ascription, and how the results compare to
a previous US study. In particular, we analyzed the
possible role of cultural differences and religiosity in
comparison to the US study, as well as the influence
of age, gender, socio-demographics, knowledge about
and familiarity with UWS patients and medical ex-
pertise in the German sample.
General results showed that German participants
ascribe as much or more, but not less mental abilities to
UWS patients than to the dead. On the single item basis
they ascribe significantly more ‘emotions and feelings’, as
well as ‘personality’ to a UWS patient. Additionally, it is
worth noticing, that in the present study participants
tend to disagree with all mind-items for the dead person
(dead and corpse condition; means under 4 which indi-
cates that most participants disagree with the item),
while they endorse that UWS patients have ‘emotions
and feelings’ as well as that they possess a personality
(means over 4, indicating agreement). Furthermore, and
in line with cultural difference, the mean mind ascrip-
tions differ significantly between Germany and the USA,
with the German participants viewing UWS as a state of
life rather than ‘something less than dead’ [9] (p.278).
So, from our results, it seems that Germans indeed hesi-
tate to see a living body as mindless, since the living, but
injured brain was less likely seen without mind. How-
ever, as obvious from Fig. 1, mind ascription to a UWS
patients varies greatly between participants.
We also found, that the Germans find the situation
significantly less tragic for themselves and for their fam-
ilies than the US sample does. This was predicted by dif-
ferences between German and American cultures,
mainly on the ‘individualism’, scale by Hofstede [32, 40],
which implies that for the US, as the most individualistic
culture, the loss of autonomy and self-determination
should result in a most aversive situation.
To explain the generally low mind ascription to a
UWS patient and the astonishingly high mind ascription
to a dead person within the US sample, Gray argued that
the ‘apparent reasons for such perceptions are afterlife
beliefs and the tendency to focus on the bodies of UWS
patients (Experiment 2)’ [9], (p. 278). Regarding the
other conditions, we found, that religious participants
tend to ascribe more mind in all but the life condition.
This is in line with Demertzi [41] who found in her
study that religion was the best predictor for the partici-
pants’ answers, ‘Yes, the UWS patient can feel pain’
which means that religious participants were more likely
to ascribe a specific subjective experience to the patient
than non-religious participants were. However, as pre-
dicted, in our study implicit dualism seems to play no
important role for ascribing mind to the dead since
mind ascription did not drop significantly in the corpse
condition for low religious Germans. Furthermore, if im-
plicit dualism were the explanation, Germans would
ascribe fewer mental abilities to the dead than
Table 4 Stepwise backward regression model
B SE B β t
Constant 4.66 .78 5.99***
Age −0.02 .01 −.39 −3.84***
Religiosity index 0.10 .05 .14 2.14*
Socio-economic status
Students −0.77 .72 −.30 −1.07
Vocational training −0.39 .69 −.15 −0.57
Employed university graduates −0.77 .70 −.22 −1.10
Graduate Professionals −0.54 .70 −.15 −0.77
Retirees −0.25 .80 −.04 −0.31
R2 = .15; p < 0.05 *, p < 0.01 **, p < 0.001***
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Americans do, which was not the case. Germans as-
cribed selectively more abilities to the UWS patient than
Americans did.
Therefore, implicit dualism seems indeed not as wide-
spread a phenomenon in Germany as it is in USA. How-
ever, at least for some German participants the line
between life and death for these patients may likewise be
somewhat blurred. Concerning the manipulation check,
we excluded 72 participants who had given the wrong
answerer to the question of what happened to David in
the vignette story. In the death vignette one was ex-
cluded because he stated that David was alive, 9 thought
he had survived with severe brain damage (which would
be the correct answer for the PVS vignette). In the life
vignette 15 were excluded because they said David sur-
vived with severe brain damage. In the PVS vignette
however, 43 participants (42,5% of all participants failing
the manipulation check) answered that David had died.
Fischer’s exact test confirms that this is significantly
more than in the other vignettes (p < 0.000). Given the
description of the PVS vignette with the very severe
brain damage and no hope of recovery, stating that Da-
vid was dead might not have been a real mistake. Maybe
some of the participants actually thought that, while the
body was still alive, the person David had died. This is of
course a speculation, but if so, the practice of excluding
these participants from the study might have actually ex-
cluded mostly participants that engage in active dualism.
Further studies could address this issue by asking the
participants to explain their choice of answer.
Differences in the amount of dualism in different soci-
eties are in fact documented within previous studies: For
example, dualism is widespread in the USA [42, 43],
whereas Demertzi and colleagues [44] comparing dual-
ism beliefs between an Edinburgh-sample (Scotland) and
a Liège-sample (Belgium) found substantial differences,
with dualism being significantly more common in Edin-
burgh. To the best of our knowledge, no study has dir-
ectly compared dualism beliefs for USA and Germany so
far, but the more general role of religion has been sub-
ject to various studies. Verweij [45], for example, points
out, that there is an ongoing secularization within all
Western countries, except the United States - the only
Western culture relatively untouched by secularization.
Gray also argued that ‘there may also be other vari-
ables operating in perception of UWS patients, such as
liking and familiarity’ [9], (p.279). Very recent studies
seems to confirm that since Moretta et al. demonstrated,
that patients caregivers tend to ascribe more interaction
abilities to their relatives than physicians do [46]. How-
ever, in our study neither familiarity with nor the sub-
jective knowledge about UWS patients influences the
mind perception of the participants. There is, however,
an effect for a medical background. Gray speculated that
it might be possible that ‘even doctors may see UWS pa-
tients as having less mind than the dead’ [9] (p.279), a
conclusion drawn from the fact that many health care
professionals, at least in Belgium, also advocate dualism
[41]. In our sample, participants with a medical back-
ground were explicitly included. This covers physicians
as well as nurses, medical technical assistants, physio-
therapists, psychologists and paramedics. Mind ascrip-
tion differed specifically in the UWS condition, with
participants with medical background ascribing, contrary
to Gray’s hypothesis, significantly more mental capacity
to UWS patients than to the dead. Similarly, Demertzi
asked European paramedical caregivers and medical doc-
tors whether or not they think that a UWS patient can
experience pain: Here, about 60% of the participants an-
swered with ‘Yes’, therefore ascribing this mental ability
to the patient [41]. Kuehlmeyer and colleagues investi-
gated the same question in German and Canadian physi-
cians and here as many as 70% ascribed the ability to
feel pain to UWS patients. Another 51% believed that
patients are able to feel touch and 21% of the physicians
even were convinced that UWS patients can experience
dreams [47].
It has been argued that the contact with the pa-
tients increases the likelihood of ascribing mental
capacities [48]. This could explain the present ten-
dency for nurses and therapeutic professions, who
usually spend more time with the patients than doc-
tors, to ascribe the most mind, whereas doctors, on
average, ascribe as much mind as our non-medical
participants. However, this explanation would suggest
that participants who personally know and in par-
ticular care for a UWS patient should also ascribe
more mind, which was not observed for the non-
medically trained participants. This contradicts the
explanation that it is the mere exposure and time
spent that leads to a higher mind ascription. A pos-
sible explanation would be, that participants with
medical background often know more than one pa-
tient, resulting in more experience with the variabil-
ity of brain functions, recovery, conscious experience
and survival. They might also know more about sci-
entific studies that indicate very high rates of false
diagnoses [21, 49] as well as brain activity in UWS
and minimally consciousness state [50–52], which
have revealed conscious perception in patients that
seem completely unresponsive at bedside examin-
ation. In fact, for example Yu et al. [19] found that
the majority of UWS patients respond to other peo-
ple’s cries of suffering, thus revealing some kind of
emotional responses. Such findings might lead med-
ical staff to give patients the benefit of the doubt.
Overall, present response patterns are in line with
the finding, that medical staff usually demonstrates
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much more negative attitudes toward active euthan-
asia than the lay population [30, 53, 54].
Another difference between the German and the US
study is the correlation between perceived tragedy of the
situation and mind ascription. In the USA people find
the state of UWS the more adverse the less mind they
ascribe to the patients, whereas in Germany, the oppos-
ite is true. This could result from the general value sys-
tem in which the two correlated variables are embedded
[55]. Coming from the most individualistic culture, US
participants might prefer the possibility of conscious ex-
perience (which includes suffering) over experiencing
nothing. In Germany, as a less individualistic culture, the
correlation is also significant but in the opposite direc-
tion, suggesting that Germans perceive UWS as more
tragic when ascribing more mind - maybe taking into ac-
count that with more mental abilities the possibility of
conscious suffering also increases. If this is indeed a cul-
tural phenomenon, than it would be interesting to see
whether this judgment becomes even more pronounced
within collectivist and perhaps particularly Buddhist so-
cieties. However, it is also possible, that the specific his-
tory of Germany (where during the Third Reich disabled
persons were viewed as ‘unworthy of life’ and mass “eu-
thanasia” was performed) could make Germans more re-
luctant to value any life as worse than death. If so, other
otherwise similar societies (e.g. Swiss or perhaps French)
with no history of nationalism should rate the tragedy of
the situation more like the US participants.
In general, and in detail pointed out by Gomes and
Parrott [56], there are some complications with the
wording of the UWS vignette itself, such as the detailed
description of a completely destroyed brain and the
quotation marks on the used term: technically ‘alive’ in
the UWS vignette. We adopted both in our translations.
The very description of David’s state could make it hard
for participants to ascribe any mental abilities to David
and may test the participants’ intuition about brain func-
tions more than their intuitive beliefs about UWS [56].
Another concern with wording results from the trans-
lation into German: We cannot be sure that the German
term ‘Wachkoma’ (waking-coma), which is the com-
monly used term for UWS among the German popula-
tion at large, triggers the same context for Germans as
does ‘vegetative state’ in US Americans. ‘Wachkoma’
might have a more transient connotation for Germans
than ‘vegetative state’ has for Americans. ‘Wachkoma’
also contains the word ‘(a)wake’ which implies an im-
provement to the coma-condition, focusing on the abil-
ity of the patients to open their eyes. The ‘vegetative’ in
vegetative state, on the other hand, focuses on the inabil-
ities of the patient and his or her “vegetative condition”
which might evoke, and has been suggested to bring up,
associations of vegetable-likeness [2]. This, in turn might
have triggered different mind - sets in participants which
might have led to different evaluations of mind between
German and American participants. However, the story
itself does make it very clear, that David’s ‘Wachkoma’
was very futile in terms of outcome. Thus, further re-
search should aim to avoid these methodological issues
by assessing the contexts that are activated due to differ-
ent term-translations which could also be found with
other languages.
Moreover, due to different recruiting methods, we
might have divergent selection biases in recruiting the
two samples. Neither Gray’s nor our sampling rely solely
on students but recruited participants also randomly at
either public places (Gray) or via link circulation in so-
cial media (current study). It is conceivable that the
paper-and-pencil questionnaires that Gray et al. used in
two of their studies, differ as such from on-line ques-
tionnaires in a hitherto unknown way.
Regarding demographic information, very little is avail-
able about the US sample. Therefore, we have no means
to compare for potentially influencing factors, like edu-
cational level and socio-economic status. Nevertheless
we were able to compare the samples for mean age and
gender distribution: Gray’s sample is, on average, youn-
ger (m = 26 years, t(213) = 26.21, p < .001) and contained
more male participants (about 50%). In our data, there
was a significant correlation of age with mind ascription
in the UWS condition (r(219) = − 0.33, p < 0.000) where
the younger participants ascribed more mind but no dif-
ferences in mind ascription according to gender. This
might suggest that, with our sample being older on aver-
age, and younger participants ascribing more mind, we
might even have underestimated the differences in mind
ascription between the US and the German sample.
Additionally, in our sample, the effect of age was not
mediated through religiosity or the fact, that younger
participants might have easier access to information
about UWS since we found no correlation between the
self assed religiosity of participants and age (r(221)
= .122, p > .05) or between the knowledge about UWS
and age (r(218) = .129, p > .05).
Conclusion
In sum, our data demonstrates that within the German
sample, participants tend to ascribe mind to a UWS pa-
tient. In detail, German participant ascribe ‘emotions
and feelings’ as well as a ‘personality’ to the UWS pa-
tient. Nevertheless, perception of UWS also varies
greatly within the German sample. The presently
assessed factors were able to account of 15% of the vari-
ance. However, the observed differences between the
German and the US sample are consistent with import-
ant cross-cultural differences in the perception of UWS,
the German participants ascribing more mind to UWS
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patients. Mind ascription reduces the risk of the patients
to become objectified and therefore be denied moral
rights [8]. Furthermore, if people ascribe mental abilities,
patients are much more likely to be seen as persons, and
by definition, a person (in contrast to a non-person) can
be wronged [6].
This is important, because, in times of declining finan-
cial support for the healthcare systems, and an increas-
ing legalization of euthanasia [30], it depends on the
public whether ‘the right to die’ will be the only right
conceded to UWS patients. However, given previous re-
sults on brain functions [19, 50–52] as well as unex-
pected late recovery [26, 57], there should also be other
rights conferred to patients. Those rights could include,
but are not limited to, the right of a correct diagnosis,
the right for an empirically tested prognosis, the right
for treatment and the right for inclusion into activities
of daily living [29].
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